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This paper reassesses the importance of colonial status to investors before 1914 by means of 
multivariable regression analysis of the data available to contemporaries.  We show that 
British colonies were able to borrow in London at significantly lower rates of interest than 
non-colonies precisely because of their colonial status, which mattered more than either gold 
convertibility or a balanced budget. Allowing for differences not only in monetary and fiscal 
policy but also in economic development and location, the “Empire effect” was a discount of 
around 100 basis points. We conclude that investors saw colonial status as a no-default 
guarantee. 




It was obvious to contemporaries that membership of the British Empire gave poor countries 
access to the British capital market at lower interest rates than these countries would have paid 
had they been politically independent.1 For liberal critics of the Empire, this “Empire effect” 
seemed detrimental to the economic health of the British Isles, which might otherwise have 
attracted a higher proportion of aggregate investment. Later historians agreed that this was 
one of the ways in which, by the later nineteenth century, the Empire had become a drain on 
British resources. From the point of the view of the colonies, on the other hand, the ability to 
raise funds in London at relatively low interest rates must surely have been a benefit – a point 
seldom acknowledged by critics of imperialism. It seems implausible that the Empire effect 
was simultaneously bad for Britain and bad for her colonies.  
 
But did the Empire effect actually exist other than in contemporary imaginations? Recent 
econometric studies of financial markets before the First World War have pointed instead to 
the gold standard as conferring a “good housekeeping seal of approval”, which lowered the 
borrowing costs of poorer countries regardless of whether they were colonies or not.  
An alternative hypothesis that has been advanced is that it was a country’s fiscal policy, in the 
context of global monetary conditions, that was the prime determinant of market assessments 
of creditworthiness. Were institutions and investors in the City of London more interested in a 
country’s commitment to a pegged exchange rate – or to a prudent fiscal policy – than in its 
degree of political dependence? It will be seen at once that these things are not easily 
disentangled. Nevertheless, this paper seeks to reassess the importance of colonial status in 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Nitin Malla for research assistance. We would also like to thank Michael Bordo, Michael 
Clemens, Marc Flandreau, Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, Trish Kelly, Chris Meissner, Ronald Oaxaca, Thomas 
Pluemper, Hugh Rockoff, Martin Schueler, Irving Stone, Alan Taylor, Adrian Tschoegl, Marc Weidenmier, and  
Jeffrey Williamson for comments and/or assistance with the construction of the dataset. 
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the eyes of investors before the First World War by means of multivariable regression 
analysis. We make two contributions. First, we use a new and substantially larger sample than 
previous scholars have used to address this question. Secondly, we give priority to variables 
that we know were available to and were heeded by contemporary investors. This approach 
allows us to reinstate the “Empire effect” as a key determinant of interest rates in the pre-1914 
bond market. While previous studies merely asserted that colonial bond yields were lower 
than those of independent borrowers, we demonstrate this by controlling for other relevant 
economic factors such as monetary and fiscal policy as well as exports and geographical 
location.  
 
Financial globalization before 1914 
Although this paper is concerned principally with bond prices, these cannot be discussed 
without at least some reference to flows of capital – though the relationship between prices 
and flows is very far from being a straightforward one. Between 1865 and 1914 more than £4 
billion flowed from Britain to the rest of the world, giving the country a historically 
unprecedented and since unequalled position as a global net creditor – “the world’s banker” 
indeed; or, to be exact, the world’s bond market. By 1914 total British assets overseas 
amounted to somewhere between £3.1 and £4.5 billion, as against British GDP of £2.5 
billion.2 This portfolio was authentically global: around 45 percent of British investment went 
to the United States and the colonies of white settlement, 20 percent to Latin America, 16 
percent to Asia and 13 percent to Africa, compared with just 6 percent to the rest of Europe.3 
Adding together all British capital raised through public issues of securities, as much went to 
Africa, Asia and Latin America between 1865 and 1914 as to the United Kingdom itself.4 As 
                                                 
2 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, pp. 161-63. 
3 Maddison, World Economy, Table 2-26a. 
4 Davis and Huttenback, Mammon, p. 46. 
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is well known, British investment in developing economies principally took the form of 
portfolio investment in infrastructure, especially railways and port facilities. But British 
investors also sank considerable (and not easily calculable) sums directly into plantations to 
produce new cash crops like tea, cotton, indigo and rubber.   
 
It has been claimed that there was something of a “Lucas effect” in the first period between 
1880 and 1914, in other words that British capital tended to gravitate towards relative wealthy 
countries rather than relatively poor countries.5 Yet the bias in favor of rich countries was 
much less pronounced than it is today. In 1997 only around 5 percent of the world’s stock of 
capital was invested in countries with per capita incomes of a fifth or less of US per capita 
GDP. In 1913, according to Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor, the proportion was 25 
percent.6  Very nearly half of all international capital stocks in 1914 were invested in 
countries with per capita incomes a third or less of Britain’s,7 and Britain accounted for nearly 
two fifths of the total sum invested in these poor economies. The contrast between the past 
and the present is striking. Whereas today’s rich economies prefer to “swap” capital with one 
another, largely bypassing poor countries, a century ago the rich economies had very large, 
positive net balances with the less well-off countries of the world. 
 
How important was the Empire as a destination for British capital? According to the best 
available estimates, more than two fifths (42 percent) of the cumulative flows of portfolio 
                                                 
5 According to Clemens and Williamson, “about two-thirds of [British capital exports] went to the labor-scarce 
New World where only a tenth of the world’s population lived, and only about a quarter of it went to labor-
abundant Asia and Africa where almost two-thirds of the world’s population lived”: Clemens and Williamson, 
“British Foreign Capital”, p.1. 
6 Obstfeld and Taylor, “Globalization and Capital Markets”, p. 60, figure 10. 
7 Schularick, “International Investment”, table 1. 
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investment from Britain to the rest of the world went to British possessions. An alternative 
measure – the imperial proportion of stocks of overseas investment on the eve of the First 
World War – was even higher: 46 percent.8 An obvious hypothesis would therefore be that 
investors a century ago were more willing to invest money in relatively poor countries 
because a high proportion of these countries were not sovereign states but were under the 
political control of the investors’ own country. 
 
Public borrowing and risk premia 
Investing money in faraway places is always risky: what economists call “informational 
asymmetries” are generally greater, the further the lender is from the borrower.9 Less 
developed economies also tend to be rather more susceptible to economic, social and political 
crises. Why then were pre-1914 British investors willing to risk such a high proportion of 
their savings by purchasing securities or other assets overseas? What were the criteria that 
determined their overseas investment decisions? One way to answer such questions is to 
consider the risk premia the London capital market charged to different borrowers.  In order to 
do this we constructed the largest possible database of bond yields for the period 1880–1913. 
 
Price data for government bonds quoted and traded in the London market were copied by 
hand from the leading financial publication of the time, the Investor’s Monthly Manual. Some 
additional quotations were taken from the London Stock Exchange Weekly Intelligence, the 
London Stock Exchange’s official weekly gazette. The bonds chosen had to pass three strict 
criteria to qualify as benchmark issues. First, they had to be payable in London in either 
sterling or gold. This means that we were able to focus exclusively on country risk, ignoring 
the currency risk inherent in bonds denominated in French francs or German marks (though 
                                                 
8 Ibid., table 2. 
9 Drazen, “Political-Economic Theory of Domestic Debt”. 
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this was probably rather insignificant in this period).10 Secondly, the selected bonds had to be 
issued in large volumes and actively traded. Finally, the bonds needed to be long-term, 
typically of a maturity of over ten years, and to have quotations for at least three consecutive 
years.  
 
The resulting dataset includes securities from sixty independent countries, colonies and self-
governing parts of the British Empire:11 in other words, almost the entire universe of foreign 
borrowing in the London market, reaching not only “from the Cape to Cairo” but also from 
Boston to Buenos Aires and from Budapest to Beijing.12 The rationale for constructing such a 
broad sample was to avoid the regional biases that characterized previous studies. One well-
known study on the impact of gold standard adherence on country risk by Michael Bordo and 
Hugh Rockoff used observations for just ten countries, all either European or American.13 The 
two most recent investigations of pre-1914 bond yields by Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor 
and by Marc Flandreau and Frédéric Zumer were based on samples of around twenty 
                                                 
10 This forced us to eliminate France and Germany as well as some smaller European economies that issued debt 
in domestic currency only. For the U.S. we followed Bordo and Rockoff, “Gold Standard”, by using gold 
equivalent yields instead of dollar yields. The terms of repayment of US government debt were in doubt: after 
1879, all government debt was to be payable in coin – technically silver or gold, but in practice gold. It was not 
until 1910 that gold was legally declared the only medium of repayment in the US.   
11 The complete list of countries and colonies can be found in the data appendix.  
12 The countries that were excluded despite the availability of loan quotations fulfilling our criteria were Bolivia, 
Costa Rica, Paraguay, Honduras, Salvador, and Cuba as well as some small island Empire borrowers such as 
Barbados and Trinidad, mostly for lack of economic control variables. The ability of countries to borrow 
internationally in domestic currency has been explored in detail in the “original sin” literature; see Bordo, 
Meissner and Redish, "Original Sin". 
13 Bordo and Rockoff, "Gold Standard".  
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countries.14 The samples in both cases were predominantly European and American. Quite 
clearly it is impossible to form robust conclusions about the significance of colonial status 
without including data for at least some Asian and African countries. 
 
While it is relatively easy to read both the annual coupon and the price of a bond from the 
sources, it is important not to overlook other properties that were relevant to investors. In the 
words of Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback:  
For the majority [of bonds] the creativity of the issuing agencies appears limitless. 
There were consols – never to mature; there were bonds that could be redeemed at any 
time at the discretion of the borrower (sometimes with a minimum period, sometimes 
with a maximum, and sometimes with neither); there were issues with a set fraction 
redeemed each year by lottery; there were some with a fixed minimum and a fixed 
maximum maturity, but with the additional provision that a portion be redeemed by 
lottery in each intervening year. Not is this list exhaustive; there were other 
permutations too numerous to mention.15  
Given these complexities, it is understandable that recent research has nearly always opted for 
simple price-coupon ratios (or current yields), which are also available in a commercially 
produced database.16 However, current yields and “true” yields to maturity can differ in the 
presence of deep discounts and short maturities. In constructing our dataset, we sought to 
calculate yields to maturity but found it impossible for many countries because of the limited 
information given in the Investor’s Monthly Manual. Instead, we opted for a second-best 
solution, namely a robustness check based on the “yields to investors” that the editors of the 
                                                 
14 Obstfeld and Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”; Flandreau and Zumer, Making of Global Finance. 
15 Davis and Huttenback, Mammon, p. 171. 
16 For application and further discussion of these data see Obstfeld and Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”; Clemens and 
Williamson, “British Foreign Capital”. 
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IMM calculated and printed alongside the bond prices.17 While it seems likely that those 
figures were used by contemporary investors, it is impossible to be sure that these yields are 
identical to yields to maturity in the absence of more detailed information about terms and 
maturities.18 As a consequence, we concentrated our analysis on current yields, but used the 
“yield to investors” data from the IMM to double-check our findings.  
 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for our current yield series.19 In total, we count about 
1,450 observations, roughly 900 for independent countries from Europe, America, Asia and 
Africa and about 550 for issuers from the British Empire, drawn from these four continents as 
well as Australasia. The sheer geographical extent of the market in itself confirms rather 
impressively the degree of financial globalization before 1913. Immediately obvious from the 
yield data is the significantly lower average yield of Empire borrowers (3.89 percent) 
compared with the yields of independent countries (6.30 percent). Prima facie, these figures 
would seem to confirm Michael Edelstein’s earlier conclusion “that the British capital market 
treated empire borrowers differently from foreign borrowers”.20  
 
Table 1 about here 
                                                 
17 Each double page of the IMM contains a column called “Yield to investor at latest price”. 
18 Current yields and the yields calculated by the IMM editors are very close most of the time, but sometimes 
differed by more than 10 percent without an obvious reason.  
19 We decided to exclude about 20 observations with yields of more than 20 percent, virtually all these refer to 
Latin American loans that had been in full default for many years. The Annual Reports of the Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders indicated that investors reckoned that full repayment was most unlikely in these cases. 
Since we are interested in country risk under the condition of a positive probability of repayment – and in order 
to ensure that these extremely volatile outliers did not bias the overall regression estimates – it seemed best to 
omit those extreme observations.  
20 Edelstein, “Imperialism”, p.205. 





The obvious explanation for the “imperial discount” on bonds issued by British colonies is 
that they were in some way guaranteed by the British government and therefore in a legal 
sense indistinguishable from British bonds in terms of default risk. Edelstein writes that 
“Indian government bonds carried the full backing of the British government. … Before 1900 
debt issued by government of the dependent Empire nearly always came with some sort of 
London guarantee.”21 However, not all bonds had such an explicit guarantee. As Edelstein 
also acknowledged: 
Even when London backing and oversight were absent from colonial government 
issues … the British capital market charged lower interest rates than comparable 
securities from independent nations at similar levels of economic development. … The 
strong inference is that colonial status, apart from the direct guarantees, lowered 
whatever risk there was in an overseas investment and that investors were therefore 
willing to accept a lower return.22 
Writing in 1924, John Maynard Keynes noted that “Southern Rhodesia – a place in the middle 
of Africa with a few thousand white inhabitants and less than a million black ones – can place 
an unguaranteed loan on terms not very different from our own [British] War Loan.” It 
seemed equally “strange” to him that “there should be investors who prefer[ed] … Nigeria 
stock (which has no British Government guarantee) [to] … London and North-Eastern 
Railway debentures”.23  
 
                                                 
21 Ibid,, p.206. 
22 Ibid., pp.206-07. 
23 J. M. Keynes, “Advice to Trustee Investors”, pp. 204f. 
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A second explanation may lie in the effect of legislation specifically calculated to encourage 
investors to buy colonial bonds. At the turn of the century, two laws were passed, the Colonial 
Loans Act (1899) and the Colonial Stock Act (1900), which gave colonial bonds the same 
“trustee status” as the benchmark British government perpetual bond, the “consol”.24 At a 
time when a rising proportion of the national debt was being held by Trustee Savings Banks, 
this was an important stimulus to the market for colonial securities.25 However, the 
importance of this legislation should not be exaggerated. The average difference between 
colonial and non-colonial yields was about 250 basis points between 1880 and 1898 and about 
180 basis points between 1899 and 1913 – in other words the premium on colonial bonds was 
actually lower before the Colonial Loans Act and Colonial Stock Act came into force. Prior to 
the First World War, these acts were the only formal encouragements to investors to favor 
colonial bonds. It was only after the war that the Treasury and the Bank of England began 
systematically to give preference to new bond issues by British possessions over new issues 
by independent foreign states.26 
 
There were other, less formal reasons why pre-war investors may have incorporated an 
imperial discount when pricing bonds. The British imposed a distinctive set of institutions on 
their colonies that was very likely to enhance their appeal to investors. Among these were 
economic openness (free trade as well as free capital movements) and balanced budgets – to 
say nothing of the rule of law (specifically, British style property rights) and relatively non-
                                                 
24 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, pp. 439, 570. See for a detailed discussion, J. M. Keynes, “Foreign 
Investment” pp. 275-84.  
25 MacDonald, Free Nation Deep in Debt, p. 380. 
26 Atkin, “Official Regulation”, pp. 324-35. 
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corrupt administration.27 In other words, investors who put their cash in colonies could count 
on the full range of Victorian “public goods”. It would therefore be rather puzzling if 
investors had regarded Australia as no more creditworthy than Argentina, or Canada as no 
more creditworthy than Chile. Even colonial constitutions had been drafted with at least one 
eye on creditor preferences.28 It was inconceivable, declared one colonial governor in 1933, 
that the interest due on Gold Coast bonds should be compulsorily reduced: why should British 
investors “accept yet another burden for the relief of persons in another country who have 
enjoyed all the benefits but will not accept their obligation”?29 When the self-governing 
dominion of Newfoundland came to the brink of default in the early 1930s, a royal 
commission under Lord Amulree recommended that its parliament be dissolved, its 
government be entrusted to a six-man commission and a royal Governor be appointed from 
London. Amulree’s report made it clear that he and his committee regarded the end of 
representative government as a lesser evil than default.30 
 
The imposition of direct British rule thus amounted to an unconditional “no default” 
guarantee; the only uncertainty investors had to face concerned the expected duration of 
British rule. Before 1914, despite the growth of nationalist movements in colonies from 
Ireland to India, political independence still seemed a distinctly remote prospect; even the 
                                                 
27 Ferguson, Empire, esp. ch. 4. A modern survey of 49 countries concluded that common-law countries offered 
“the strongest legal protections of investors”. The fact that eighteen of the countries in the sample have the 
common law system is, of course, almost entirely due to their having been at one time or another under British 
rule: La Porta et al., “Law and Finance”. 
28 Writing in the 1950s, the Canadian historian Harold Innis declared: ”The constitution of Canada, as it appears 
on the statute book of the British Parliament, has been designed to secure capital for the improvement of 
navigation and transport”: Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 233. 
29 Ibid., pp. 584f. 
30 Hale, “British Empire”. 
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major colonies of white settlement had been granted only a limited political autonomy. In the 
words of Cain and Hopkins: “One of the key reasons why the colonies could borrow cheaply 
[was that] they offered almost complete safety.”31 
 
Determinants of bond spreads: alternative hypotheses 
The possibility exists, however, that other considerations mattered more to investors than the 
extent to which a country’s sovereignty had been reduced by imperialism. An alternative 
explanation that has been advanced for differentials in pre-1914 yields relates to monetary 
policy rather than colonial status. Bordo and Rockoff argued that adherence to the gold 
standard worked as a credible “commitment mechanism”, reassuring investors that 
governments would not pursue time-inconsistent fiscal and monetary policies.32 Investors 
rewarded this binding policy commitment by charging – ceteris paribus – lower risk premia. 
The gold standard worked in this respect as a “good housekeeping seal of approval”. A 
commitment to gold convertibility, they calculate, reduced the yield on a country’s bonds by 
around 40 basis points.33 Using a somewhat larger sample, Obstfeld and Taylor confirmed 
that gold standard membership lowered spreads.34 In this analysis, therefore, it was the 
expansion of the gold standard rather than the expansion of the British Empire that lowered 
the yields paid by some emerging markets.35 As Obstfeld and Taylor conclude, “Membership 
                                                 
31 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 240. 
32 Bordo and Kydland, “Commitment Mechanism”, p. 56; Bordo and Schwartz, “Monetary Policy Regimes”, p. 
10. 
33 Bordo and Rockoff, “Gold Standard”’, pp. 327f. 
34 Obstfeld and Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”, p.253. 
35 Eichengreen and Flandreau, “Geography”, table 2. 
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in the British was neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for preferential access to 
London’s capital market before 1914.”36  
 
As a contingent commitment, however, membership of the gold standard was nothing more 
than a promise of self-restraint under certain circumstances. Independent countries on gold 
were not members of some kind of monetary union. They retained the right to suspend 
convertibility in the event of an emergency such as a war, revolution or a sudden deterioration 
in the terms of trade. Such emergencies were in fact quite common before 1914.  Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile all experienced serious financial and monetary crises between 1880 and 
1914. By 1895 the currencies of all three had depreciated by around 60 percent against 
sterling. This had serious implications for their ability to service their external debt, which 
was denominated in hard currency (usually sterling) rather than domestic currency. Argentina 
defaulted in 1888–1893, and Brazil in both 1898 and 1914. In other words, investors who 
pinned their faith in a country’s adoption of the gold standard had no guarantee that a country 
would not default. Indeed, some countries made default more likely by going onto gold during 
the years of relative gold shortage between the mid 1870s and the mid 1890s, since falling 
commodity prices made it harder for them to earn from exports the hard currency they needed 
to service their external gold-denominated debts. 
 
Another alternate hypothesis is that investors were primarily interested in the fiscal policies of 
borrowing countries.  Flandreau and Zumer have recently suggested that the most important 
risk factors were public debts, the corresponding amount of debt service, and their relation to 
tax revenues.37  They find that, once differences in indebtedness are taken account of, gold 
standard adherence was insignificant. In addition, they present convincing evidence that 
                                                 
36 Obstfeld and Taylor, Sovereign Risk, p.265. 
37 Flandreau and Zumer, Making of Global Finance; see also Flandreau et al., “Stability Without a Pact”. 
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contemporary economic thinking about default risk centered on debt sustainability and the 
soundness of public finances.38 A third determinant of risk premia may simply have been 
political events. According to Ferguson, revolutions, governmental crises and wars were 
regarded by nineteenth-century investors as increasing the likelihood of defaults by the 
countries affected.39 Finally, Clemens and Williamson have integrated geographic variables in 
their analyses of spreads and found them to be significant determinants40.   
To determine whether or not membership of the British Empire genuinely lowered borrowing 
costs, it is therefore imperative to control for these and other factors. Older research on 
financial investment in the age of high imperialism looked only at raw yield data, thus leaving 
open the possibility that lower colonial spreads were a function of better economic 
“fundamentals” rather than the explicit or implicit guarantees to investors stemming from 
Empire membership.41 In other words, British colonies may simply have been able to borrow 
at lower rates than other foreign countries because they were members of the gold standard, 
had more sustainable fiscal policies, were less susceptible to political crises or were simply 
better situated relative to trade routes and temperate climatic zones. After all, the British may 
have chosen to colonize certain countries precisely because their macroeconomic 
fundamentals were relatively strong. The only way to say for sure that there was an “Empire 
effect” is therefore to regress yield spreads for the largest possible sample of sovereign and 
colonial borrowers against an appropriate range of additional variables. 
 
                                                 
38 Unfortunately, it cannot be excluded that different gold coding is responsible for the different results. 
Flandreau and Zumer, Making of Global Finance, used a de facto criterion, i.e. exchange rate stability over a 
couple of years, while Obstfeld and Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”, looked both at de jure and de facto criteria 
following Meissner, “New World Order”.  
39 See Ferguson, Cash Nexus, and Ferguson, “Political Risk”. 
40 Clemens and Williamson, “Wealth Bias”, table 4, p. 41. 
41 See Davis and Huttenback, Mammon; Edelstein, Overseas Investment; Edelstein, “Imperialism”. 
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Economic control variables 
The obvious question is which variables to include. In our view, there are powerful 
methodological objections to the inclusion of anachronistic indicators such as debt to GDP 
ratios.42 Self-evidently, people usually do not base their actions upon concepts that have not 
yet been invented or upon figures nobody yet calculates.43 Rather, if we want to determine 
how nineteenth-century investors made their decisions, we need to model their behavior 
deductively on the basis of the data that was available to them at that time.44  
 
As anyone familiar with the financial press of these days knows, there was a plethora of 
publications available to investors. Standard reference publications such as Fenn’s 
Compendium, the Investor’s Monthly Manual (henceforth IMM), the Stock Exchange Weekly 
Intelligence and the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders Annual Reports collected and 
analyzed statistical data on government borrowers not unlike the handbooks on equity 
investments pioneered by Moody’s in the United States. In addition to this dedicated financial 
press, there was a rapidly growing number of more general statistical publications. The 
Statesmen’s Yearbook is certainly the best example for Britain, but there were numerous 
continental equivalents from the 1870s onwards.45 The subtitle of the 1898 edition of “Fenn 
                                                 
42 Bordo and Rockoff, “Gold Standard”; Obstfeld and Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”. 
43 See Flandreau and Zumer, Making of Global Finance; Ferguson, “City of London”. 
44 This is a practical as well as methodological issue. A lot of financial investment went to countries for which no 
modern GDP reconstructions exist, so that research would be restricted to countries for which such data were 
reconstructed. A more practical problem discussed in greater detail in Schularick, “International Investment”, is 
the often inconsistent methodology and thus limited comparability of modern GDP reconstructions.  
45 In Germany and Austria-Hungary similar series were edited by Juraschek, Geographisch-Statistische 
Tabellen; von Brachelli, Statistische Skizzen. 
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on the Funds”,46 the self-proclaimed “doyen of all financial books of reference”, neatly 
summarizes what economic figures the City of London had access to: it was, proclaimed its 
publishers, “a handbook of public debts containing details and histories of debts, budgets and 
foreign trade of all nations, together with statistics elucidating the financial and economic 
progress and position of various countries”. These, then, were the core data investors could 
look up: public finances, foreign trade and general indicators of economic development. In 
many respects, the main problem for contemporaries was not so much the raw data in the 
numerator – for example, exports, tax revenues or public debts – but the denominator. In the 
absence of a direct measure of a nation’s wealth such as gross national product, a concept then 
its infancy, it was far from easy to compare the fundamental resources of different countries. 
Population was generally acknowledged to be an unreliable choice, though it had the 
advantage of being readily available, thanks to fairly regular and accurate censuses, and was 
often used to denominate export capacity. However, in more sophisticated analyses of fiscal 
sustainability, the debt burden tended to be related to public revenues or to export earnings.47 
The same was true of budget and trade balances.  
 
The lion’s share of our core data on public debt was collected from Fenn’s Compendium, the 
Statesmen’s Yearbook and the Annual Reports of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders.48 
                                                 
46 Probably the best overall source for country-risk indicators. Revised editions of Fenn’s Compendium were 
published in 1883, 1889, 1893, and 1898. Unfortunately, the series was then discontinued, apparently because 
the main contributor, Robert Nash, emigrated to Australia. The publication history and authorship is therefore 
slightly complicated. The 13th edition from 1883 is Nash and Fenn, Fenn’s Compendium; the 14th edition from 
1889 is Nash, Fenn’s Compendium; in 1893 it is Fenn, Fenn’s Compendium; the last publication is Oss, Fenn on 
the Funds, from 1898. 
47 For a further discussion of contemporary risk perception see Flandreau and Zumer, Making of Global Finance. 
48The Annual Reports of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders were directly exploited, but many data were 
previously collected by Trish Kelly who generously shared the dataset from Kelly, “Ability and Willingness”. 
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Additional information was gathered from the IMM and other sources as specified in the data 
appendix. Drawing on the records of the Service d’Etudes Financières of the Crédit Lyonnais, 
Flandreau and Zumer have suggested that debt service to revenue was the contemporary 
indicator that best measured the creditworthiness of borrowers.49 However, for a number of 
reasons we chose to stick to the more traditional debt to revenue ratio. First, information on 
debt service obligations was not as readily available to investors. An investor who wanted to 
compare the debt burdens of more than a handful of large European and American countries 
would have struggled to find appropriate debt service ratios. Such debt service figures as did 
exist were, in any case, frequently subject to revisions. Secondly, in view of the diversity of 
repayment arrangements described above, it was far from easy for an investor to calculate 
debt service ratios for himself. In attempting such calculations, the Crédit Lyonnais’s country 
risk department was not typical; indeed, it was the first dedicated economic research 
department of its kind. Finally, in an era of relatively low and non-volatile long-term interest 
rates, debt to revenue and debt service to revenue ratios were highly correlated, by a factor of 
close to 0.8 for the common observations (960) in our database.  
 
Another potentially important indicator for the health of public finances is the deficit to 
revenue ratio. As is the case today, comments on the health of governmental budgets could be 
found quite regularly in the financial press. More often than not, it was disapprovingly noted 
that the public finances of a country had suffered from “persistent deficits for many years” 
and a priori we would expect this to be a risk factor in its own right. As Cain and Hopkins 
have argued, the principles of “Gladstonian finance” – which aimed at budget surpluses in 
order to repay existing public debt – were all but sacrosanct in the eyes of the “gentlemanly 
capitalists” of the City of London.50 In addition, we collected information on those countries 
                                                 
49 Flandreau and Zumer, Making of Global Finance, p. 35. 
50 Cains and Hopkins, “Gentlemanly capitalism”, p. 7. 
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that breached the “London consensus” on good housekeeping by defaulting on their 
obligations; the Annual Reports of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders contain detailed 
information on defaulters. Since default damages reputation, we also constructed a control 
variable for past default within the preceding ten years.  
 
Apart from public debt data, the second class of economic statistics readily available to late-
nineteenth-century investors were those arising from foreign trade. That there was a link 
between trade and creditworthiness was obvious to contemporaries since countries needed to 
earn foreign exchange in order to service their external debts. Typical of the way 
contemporaries related exports to debt is the comment about Honduras in Fenn’s 
Compendium of 1889: “When we see that the annual export trade of Honduras is probably not 
above one twenty-fifth part of the capital of the debt, we have the type of an impossible 
burden.”51 Export capacity was also seen as a proxy for wealth and the state of economic 
development: in the words of Fenn’s  Compendium, “though no very accurate measure of 
National wealth  can be supplied, the ‘trade test’, with due allowance for artificial restrictions, 
is found to be fairly effective”.52 Since we wanted to capture the risks stemming from both 
large external deficits and low levels of international trade, we therefore collected data for 
both the trade deficit and the sterling value of exports per capita. Modern studies of country 
risk tend to use GDP per capita as a proxy for risk-reducing factors such as more stable 
politics or better institutions. The City of London had to settle for something less than that 
before the First World War, but it was looking for analogous information.53 
                                                 
51 Nash, Fenn’s Compendium, , p. xviii. 
52 Ibid, p. xx. 
53 Another possible indicator is the density of the rail track. This variable captures an idea very close to the minds 
of contemporary bondholders: foreign borrowing for the purpose of reproductive investment. See below for 
further discussion as well as Kelly, “Ability and Willingness”, and Fishlow, "Lessons from the Past”. 




Given the importance attributed by some scholars to gold standard adherence, we also wished 
to control for the positive effects of being on gold. The question of whether or not a country’s 
currency was – de facto and/or de jure – convertible into gold is in itself a difficult and 
somewhat subjective issue. For example, it is far from clear cut even for well-researched 
economies such as Austria and Italy, both of which “shadowed” the gold standard without 
officially having fully convertible currencies.54 It is even harder to be sure for smaller 
economies for which there is less readily accessible evidence about convertibility clauses and 
exchange rates.55 The very fact that such difficulties exist is in itself significant, however. One 
of the reasons why it is difficult today to identify adherence to the gold standard is that 
nineteenth-century financial publications were not very informative on the subject of 
monetary rules. Indeed, convertibility clauses were hardly ever mentioned in the sources we 
used. We cannot help noting that if the City had been as interested in currency clauses as 
some have claimed, this would not have been the case. There is therefore a subjective element 
to retrospective identifications of “on gold” and “off gold” countries, especially when these 
are based on inferred ex post from exchange rates. In many cases, it is not at all clear in which 
direction the causation runs. Adoption of gold convertibility by a country was often associated 
with much broader programs of economic, institutional and political reform, so that gold 
standard adherence may have been a consequence rather than a cause of “sound” policies.56 
Moreover, investors may have been insulated from the danger of a country’s going off gold if 
– as was very often the case – loan contracts specified that interest and amortization would be 
                                                 
54 A more detailed account of the problems involved can be found in Bordo and Kydland, “Gold Standard as a 
Rule”; Obstfeld and Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”; Meissner, “New World Order”. 
55 But compare the rich if still incomplete information in the various volumes of Schneider et al., eds.,  
Währungen der Welt. 
56 See Flandreau and Zumer, Making of Global Finance. 
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in specified gold (or sterling) terms. Nonetheless, since considerable attention has been paid 
to the role of gold adherence in reducing country risk, our estimations include two dummies 
for gold standard adherence. Following Meissner as well as Obstfeld and Taylor, we use the 
“strict” gold coding, in preference to Flandreau’s broader observed gold peg, which classified 
countries as having been on gold if in practice their exchange rate remained within a narrow 
band vis-à-vis the gold currencies. 57 We also take account of Obstfeld and Taylor’s point that 
“the market’s view of gold standard adherence [ought] to depend on whether a country [was] 
in full compliance with its debt contracts.”58 In order to obtain comparable results, we 
followed their example by including two gold dummy variables, one for non-defaulters and 
one for defaulters.  
 
Finally, we also took the idea seriously that internal or external political conflicts may have 
been important determinants of yield fluctuations. The financial press regularly attributed 
sharp changes in bond prices to political developments.59 However, it could also be argued 
that the inclusion of variables for internal and external political conflict amounts to a further 
test of our “empire effect” hypothesis. If membership in the British Empire meant benefiting 
from the pax britannica, then the absence of war could be interpreted as a direct effect of 
empire membership. 
 
                                                 
57 See Meissner, “New World Order”; Obstfeld and Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”: essentially, a combination of  “de 
jure and de facto” criteria, as opposed to the somewhat more flexible “de facto” test employed by Flandreau and 
Zumer, The Making of Global Finance. For the countries not classified in prior studies, we coded only those 
countries on gold which passed both de facto and de jure test (see data appendix). Empire borrowers without own 
currencies, thus being in a currency union with the UK, were also coded on gold.  
58 Obstfeld and Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”, p. 249. 
59 Ferguson, “Political Risk”, p. 23. 




Table 2 summarizes the core economic control variables used in the statistical analyses. 
Average debt to revenue ratios were relatively high – almost five times the amount of yearly 
revenues. Empire issuers were only slightly less indebted than independent countries. Finally, 
there is a marked difference in exports per capita, confirming conventional wisdom about the 
relative openness of the British Empire’s trade regime. The dominions and colonies exported 
about four times more per head than independent countries.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Before proceeding further, however, a few general remarks on the data seem necessary. It is 
an essential, though sometimes overlooked element of quantitative analysis to inspect the data 
closely and to be realistic about their properties. Having spent considerable time on the 
collection of late nineteenth and early twentieth century economic data, we found the quantity 
of indicators available to contemporary investors to be less of a problem than their mixed 
quality. Indeed, for most countries we found more than one series for the same indicator. 
While it was relatively rare that two series turned out to be completely incompatible, 
differences of the order of 10 percent were not uncommon. It is not difficult to trace the 
causes of such discrepancies. The compilers of statistical information in those days faced a 
number of difficulties.  For example, the editors of financial publications had to keep track of 
debt issues in various markets and denominated in various currencies; to disentangle the total 
amount of debt guaranteed by the central government as opposed to unsecured provincial 
debt; to separate paper currency debt from gold debt; to value the amount of internal debt at 
fluctuating exchange rates; and take into account the reduction of debt through complicated 
sinking fund payments or debt restructuring schemes. And all this had to be done long before 
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the notion of “transparent government”. As a consequence, breaks in the series or silent 
revisions were not rare. 
 
It is also important for our understanding of the pre-1914 bond market to be aware of the 
time-lags with which new data became available. At least in this respect, the “first age of 
globalization” was very different from our own. Today’s financial markets wait eagerly for 
economic data releases that follow a pre-announced schedule, and bond prices “react” 
immediately to the new information. Yet despite the well-known communications revolution 
of the nineteenth century, “fresh” data on basic indicators such as debt, budgets and exports 
remained unavailable for years rather than for months. The story the sources tell is that of a 
market driven not so much by short-term economic information, but by knowledge of long-
term structural trends supplemented by short-term political news from which investors 
apparently inferred fiscal and monetary policy changes. There is also ample evidence that 
well-connected investors had access to “inside” sources of information about the prospects of 
a country’s public finances.60 This should not be taken to mean that investors were indifferent 
to published fiscal or monetary data. But it does mean that there are limits to what modern 
researchers can do with such data. From an econometric perspective, it is especially doubtful 
that estimations relying only on the time-series (within countries) dimension of the data can 
yield good results. For all these reasons, we are inclined to believe that quibbling over a few 
basis points is pointless. Nevertheless, it should be possible to identify the broad determinants 
of investors’ perceptions of creditworthiness by watching out for coefficients that are not only 
highly significant, but also of meaningful magnitude in different specifications.  
 
                                                 
60 See in general Ferguson, World’s Banker, on the Rothschilds. 
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Estimating the “Empire effect” 
In order to gauge the size of the “Empire effect” on country risk premia, we first investigated 
the relationship between the spread over consols, i.e. the difference between the yield on a 
country’s bond and the yield on consols, and the economic control variables discussed above. 
We look to the coefficient of the Empire dummy (coded 1 if a borrower was a British 
possession) for an estimate of the “Empire effect”. Since no country left the Empire during 
our sample period and colonial borrowers typically tapped the market only after they had 
become part of the Empire, this dummy is time-invariant, raising a couple of technical 
questions for panel estimations which are discussed in turn.  
 
The estimation of panel or time-series cross-section data has become a standard method of 
exploring large datasets in economic history. Pooling enables us to increase the amount of 
informative data, through combining variation across countries with variation over time. It 
also makes it possible to control for exogenous events affecting all units at a point in time, 
thus to control for time effects – a crucial advantage here since we need to take account of 
global interest rate shocks affecting all countries in a specific year.61 But progress usually 
comes at a cost. Observations in time-series cross-section pools are usually not independent, 
and the presence of temporally and spatially correlated errors as well as of heteroskedasticity 
makes estimation via ordinary least squares impossible.62 We therefore borrow an estimation 
method that has become the standard for datasets like ours in quantitative research in 
                                                 
61 We opted for time-dummies instead of controlling for a constructed “world average spread” (see Obstfeld and 
Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”). Since both methods yielded almost identical results for our sample, we kept it simple.  
62 A solution in such situations is to use feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). However, FGLS produces 
overconfident standard errors of the estimated coefficients unless there are substantially more time points (T) 
than units (N). The unbalanced panel investigated here displays observations on 62 units over 35 years which 
clearly makes the use of FGLS impossible. 
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comparative political economy: OLS with panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE).63Practically speaking, this method allows for the inclusion of a unit-specific AR1 
specification to correct for serial correlation, while retaining the OLS coefficient estimates 
and calculating reliable “panel-corrected standard errors”.      
 
As noted above, our research agenda is complicated by the fact that we are interested in 
coefficient estimates for a time-invariant variable. The main implication for the estimation 
approach is that a standard fixed-effects model (or a least square dummy variables regression) 
is problematic, because the “within estimator” on the time-varying variables “sweeps away” 
all time-invariant variables. While it is possible to derive illustrative insights from the 
estimated fixed-unit effects of such models – for example, by seeing whether Empire issuers 
had on average lower overall spread levels than independent borrowers – this is not 
satisfactory for our purpose as all time-invariant variables (not only Empire membership) are 
included in the fixed effects.64 A random-effects model would technically work with time-
invariant variables, but random-unit effects are not a plausible assumption in our context. The 
remaining alternative is pooled OLS. Yet this procedure could suffer from omitted variable 
bias as cross-sectional heterogeneity is no longer captured by different intercepts.65 
Haussmann and Taylor have therefore proposed to identify and consistently estimate the 
coefficients of the time-invariant variables through a two-stage procedure.66 However, if the 
                                                 
63 This method was made popular by Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz: see Beck and Katz, “What to do (and 
not to do) with time-series”. In a different article the same authors have shown that the PCSE method is also 
superior to Kmenta’s “cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and timewise autocorrelated model” in research 
applications such as ours; Beck and Katz, "Nuisance vs. Substance”. 
64 This is what Obstfeld and Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”, do in their Empire test. The main problem with their 
approach is thus not methodological, but the limited sample of Empire borrowers.   
65 For a detailed discussion see Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis. 
66 Haussmann and Taylor, “Panel Data”. 
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unit effects are spanned (or completely accounted for) by a linear combination of the time-
invariant regressors, then pooled OLS would be the estimator of choice as it yields equivalent 
results to the two-stage procedure.67 Additionally, if it can be correctly assumed that the 
omitted regressors that explain the fixed effects are not correlated with any of the other 
regressors, then pooled OLS will still yield unbiased and consistent results. To test the 
proposition that the unit effects are accounted for by a linear combination of the time-
invariant regressors, we first ran a fixed effects model and regressed the estimated unit effects 
on the time-invariant variables including the Empire dummy, practically a variant of the 
Haussmann and Taylor method. We found that about 75 percent of the variance of the fixed 
effects is accounted for by the time-invariant variables, the remaining 25 percent being 
relatively unimportant. Secondly, we tested whether or not the coefficient of the time-variant 
variables from the fixed-effects model changes once the unit effects are taken as regressors in 
an identical specification without fixed effects. Since the coefficients on the exogenous 
variables hardly changed, we obtained an indication that potentially omitted variables 
(captured in the unit effects) are not only of limited significance, but also not correlated with 
the other regressors. In brief, we found no evidence that a specification without fixed effects 
would yield biased results.    
 
The evidence 
The results of our benchmark regression (1) lend overwhelming support to the idea of an 
Empire effect. All other things being equal, the yield on a bond would be 100 basis points 
lower if the issuer came from the British Empire. The finding is backed by the number of 
observations (1282), which is more than twice as high as in previous investigations with a 
comparable number of controls. Regression (2) repeats the specification, but uses the yields 
calculated by the IMM instead of price-coupon ratios as the dependent variable. There is no 
                                                 
67 Oaxaca and Geisler, “Fixed Effect Models”. 
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substantial change in the Empire variable, which is again highly significant and lowers 
spreads by about 1 percentage point. Regressions (3) and (4) restrict the sample to spread 
observations below 10 and 5 percentage points over consols to test whether the “Empire 
effect” withers once very high country risks are excluded. However, Empire membership 
remains worth about 100 basis points no matter what restrictions on country risk levels we 
impose. The only effect is that the explanatory power of our model (r-squared) rises from 0.65 
to above 0.75.  
 
What about the macroeconomic control variables? Our regressions clearly strengthen the 
“public finance” school of thought on determinants of pre-1914 bond spreads: the debt to 
revenue ratio is correctly signed and significant at the 1 percent level (and below) in all 
regressions. Nor is the elasticity negligible. At mean regressor values, a 30 percent increase of 
the debt to revenue ratio raises spreads by 10 percent. As for gold standard adherence, our 
results provide mixed evidence and point to the need for further dedicated analysis.68 While 
the gold standard variable (conditional on no default) is correctly signed throughout, gold 
adherence passes a strong significance test only in regression (3) and is again insignificant in 
regression (4). In these two regressions, gold standard adherence has the expected effect of a 
10 to 25 basis points reduction of spreads. However, we found that, unlike the debt to revenue 
ratio, the gold standard dummy is rather sensitive to changes in the estimation specification 
and to even slight differences in the coding criteria.  
 
As expected, both defaulters and previous defaulters were heavily penalized by the City, but 
the budget deficit seems to have had no effect on spreads. One possible explanation is that 
investors did not regularly follow the budget balances of various countries, but concentrated 
on debt indicators instead since an excess of expenditure over revenues would show up in the 
                                                 
68 We plan to exploit our dataset for this purpose in a forthcoming article.  
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debt figures. The picture is different for the external trade indicators. The trade balance is 
correctly signed and significant throughout. Other things being equal, if countries ran an 
export surplus they would have lower borrowing costs, but the magnitude of this effect is 
rather small. The reason may be that large sample sizes such as ours can give rise to 
coefficients with low standard errors, so that coefficients of almost trivial magnitude may test 
different from zero.69 Contrary to our expectations, we find exports per capita positively 
signed throughout the regressions, implying higher borrowing costs for more open 
economies.70 This can be rationalized if the market viewed export dependence as a source of 
vulnerability, but again the magnitude of the effect is rather small. Our estimations also lend 
some support to the argument that political factors were important spread determinants: any 
incidence of internal political conflict raises spreads by as much as 80 basis points. We find 
no evidence, however, that international conflicts – of which there were, of course, relatively 
few in the period – had much influence. 
 
The inclusion of regional dummy variables or other geographical controls has become 
standard in quantitative explorations of cross-country spreads in order to account for the 
various economic effects associated with geography: not only information asymmetries and 
transport costs, but also indirect effects of regional proximity such as common shocks, records 
of regional political stability or culture.71 As part of our sensitivity checks (regressions 5-8), 
we tested different geographic variables as well as one specification without any geographic 
controls (7). None of these changed our main finding.  
                                                 
69 Kennedy, Guide to Econometrics, p. 395. 
70 Flandreau and Zumer, Making of Global Finance, p. 49, also report a wrong sign on the export per capita 
variable for their full sample.  
71 See Eichengreen and Mody, “Changing Spreads”; Clemens and Williamson, “British Foreign Capital”, Kamin 
and Kleist, “Credit Spreads”; Cline and Barnes, “Spreads and Risk”. 
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Table 3 about here 
 
A number of other sensitivity checks are reported in the next table.72 Regression (5) 
substitutes the regional dummies of the first regressions for a geographic constant used in 
comparable studies – the pre-Panama canal shipping distance from London. By this measure, 
the Empire effect is even stronger, at more than 150 basis points. It is also noteworthy that 
exports per capita turn insignificant, while the effect of gold standard adherence grows. 
Regression (6) adds an additional control variable, perhaps the best (albeit still crude) 
indicator available to nineteenth-century investors of the level of a country’s economic 
development: the density of the rail network. Its inclusion increases the “Empire effect” to 
more than 150 basis points. In contrast, regression (7) does not include any geographical 
control. Of all specifications we tried, this is the one with the smallest – though still 
statistically highly significant – “Empire effect”. Without controlling for geography, Empire 
membership was worth slightly less than 90 basis points. This would seem to imply that 
Empire membership was particularly important for the geographically most remote regions. In 
regression (8) we repeat regression (7) but limit our sample to “developing countries”, in other 
words relatively poor countries.73  Here, the Empire effect reaches 140 basis points, 
suggesting that being part of the British Empire was crucial for the country risk of less-
developed African and Asian colonies. 
 
Table 4 about here 
   
 
                                                 
72 In all these sensitivity checks we report only the regressions based on current yield spreads to save space. The 
results obtained by regressing the yields calculated directly by the Investors Monthly Manual were comparable.  
73 See data appendix for the countries included. 
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Further sensitivity tests involved the inclusion of debt and revenues per capita, debt to 
exports, the growth rate of exports and of the population, lagged independent variables, 
dummy variables for natural resource exporters, for capital-poor and capital-rich economies 
and the regression of end-of-period spreads, in other words, spreads calculated at December 
closing prices. We also ran pure cross-sections for period averages. None of this changed our 
main finding on the size and significance of Empire membership, which was worth about 100 
basis points.  
 
Bond spreads within the British Empire 
The next part of our analysis of spread determinants is devoted to an equally old question in 
the study of the British Empire: who profited most from preferential access to the London 
capital market – the dependent Empire, the Dominions or India? Ceteris paribus, which did 
investors see as a safer place to put their money? Davis and Huttenback have given the 
following answer to this question: “The colonies with responsible government borrowed on 
terms that, although perhaps not quite as favorable as those received by India and the 
dependent colonies, were still far below the rates charged even to the most advanced 
nations.”74 Looking in detail at loan issues in the period under investigation, they conclude 
that “within the British Empire, India consistently paid less for capital than either the 
dependent colonies or those with responsible government.”75 Does this finding – based on 
groupings of yield data without further controls – stand up to the inclusion of economic 
controls for the level of debt, the external position and the state of development?  
 
Regressions 9 to 11 exploit our dataset to give a more comprehensive answer. They 
essentially confirm the conclusions of Davis and Huttenback: Indian bonds had a distinctly 
                                                 
74 Davis and Huttenback, Mammon, p. 170. 
75 Ibid., p. 174. 
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lower risk premium than either dependent or self-governing borrowers within the Empire. We 
estimate India’s financing advantage to have been between 20 to 30 basis points. This result is 
not surprising since, unlike some other colonial bonds, “Indian government bonds carried the 
backing of the British government and were listed in the official rosters of the London stock 
exchange with ‘British funds’.”76 However, contrary to conventional wisdom we do not find 
evidence that the self-governing borrowers were seen as more risky places, even if London’s 
oversight over their fiscal policies was much weaker. Both the Dominions and the dependent 
Empire could borrow at terms distinctly more favorable than comparable independent nations. 
But within the Empire the prime beneficiary was clearly India.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Country risk and capital flows 
The City of London viewed borrowers from the British Empire as safe places to invest. As a 
result, distant colonies gained access to the London capital market at cheaper rates than 
comparable sovereign states. But what implications did this have for the amounts of capital 
that flowed from Britain to her Empire? In other words, did the “Empire effect” mean more 
capital as well as lower interest rates? Any answer to this question depends both on 
counterfactual argumentation and ceteris paribus assumptions and must therefore remain 
highly speculative. Nevertheless, such questions have been raised before and played an 
important role in the debate on the costs and benefits of British imperialism, and we therefore 
cannot ignore them.77 Edelstein, for example, estimated that the dependent Empire would 
have received only as much capital per head as other comparably developed but independent 
countries at about twice the actual interest rate, and concluded on that basis “that the non-
                                                 
76 Edelstein, “Imperialism”, p. 206. 
77 See Davis and Huttenback, Mammon, p. 174; Edelstein, “Imperialism”, pp.207-10. 
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white-settler colonies would have had British investments one fifth their actual £140 and £480 
million levels in 1870 and 1913”.78 By the same token, the self-governing parts of the Empire 
would have received about 30 percent less capital.  
 
Figure 1 allows a first visual impression of the patterns of international borrowing in the 
London capital market, and underlines the risk aversion of British financial investors. More 
than 60 percent of aggregate public borrowing in the boom years between 1900 and 1913 was 
concentrated in the low-risk segment of the market (spreads of less than 100 basis points), 
while another 30 percent went to public borrowers whose spreads were less than 200 basis 
points above the British consol. This tendency looks even more pronounced if borrowing is 
denominated by population. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that, if the colonies had 
suddenly had independence thrust upon them, capital flows would have fallen rather 
substantially.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the interaction between yields and quantities in the 
international portfolio investment market is far from simple. As the interest rate itself has a 
strong influence on the risk of default, a higher price does not necessarily translate into a 
higher expected return. Technically speaking, the supply curve of capital will have a 
backward bending part since higher interest rates decrease the probability of repayment, hence 
the expected yield.79 Moreover, sovereign risk and moral hazard are likely to give rise to 
                                                 
78 Edelstein, “Imperialism”, p.209. 
79 See Aizenman, “Investment”, p.88. 
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market segmentation and ceilings on indebtedness.80 There are thus good reasons to expect 
that rising risk premia will tend to reduce capital flows since investors will wish to limit their 
exposure to high-risk assets.81 However, while risk premia are certainly a key determinant of 
capital flows, comparably important roles are played by investment opportunities, the 
institutional environment and country fundamentals.  Following contemporary research on 
capital flows we take a simple deductive approach, and estimate the determinants of financial 
flows in a linear cross-sectional model accounting for country-specific pull factors and global 
push factors.82  
 
First, we look at the determinants of capital flows to independent countries, since we assume 
that British colonies and dominions were subject to the same patterns of interaction between 
price and quantity. Second, we use five-year averages to level out cyclical effects, reduce the 
impact of outliers, and get a reliable picture of the underlying factors. Third, we control for a 
number of other plausible determinants, regressing the yearly average capital inflows per 
capita not only on spreads, but also on population (to control for market size), average 
population and export growth (for demographic and growth trends), and on the ratio of rail 
miles in operation to country size (as a proxy for opportunities for “reproductive investment”). 
Finally, we include UK interest rates as a push factor. 
 
Table 6 about here 
                                                 
80 For theoretical aspects of international lending and sovereign risk see  Sachs, “Theoretical Issues”; Eaton et. 
al., “Theory of Country Risk”; Hermalin and Rose, “Risks to Lenders”; Mody and Taylor, “International Capital 
Crunches”. 
81 This is also in line with contemporary research, which has found higher risk to be associated with lower capital 
flows, see Taylor and Sarno, “Capital Flows”. 
82 Such detailed analysis of British financial investment is possible since the publication of the flow data in 
Stone, Global Export. 




Regression (12) includes the full sample of British non-colonial investment, while regression 
(13) limits the sample to the developed countries and regression (14) to the less developed 
countries outside Western Europe and North America. The main finding of interest is that 
higher risk premia were indeed associated with lower flows. The elasticity, about 0.25 at mean 
regressor values, is also substantial. In view of the exploratory character of the estimation, we 
are inclined not too read too much evidence into these results. However, the significance of 
market size and the positive impact of population growth in less developed countries are at 
least suggestive. That the development of the rail network is negatively signed is also in line 
with previous findings that countries with unexploited opportunities for “reproductive” 
investment received relatively more capital.83 At the very least, it seems legitimate to 
conclude that the higher country risks that would have been consequent on an “Edwardian 
decolonization” would have decreased capital flows to Britain’s former possessions. For 
British investors did not place voluminous bets on risky governments; they extended 
relatively more credit to the low-risk segment of the market. Given this preference, the appeal 
of investing in the Empire is obvious. Colonial loans were comparatively safe, but offered 
returns that were still significantly higher than those on British consols.  
 
Conclusions 
Our findings indicate that the “Empire effect” observed by so many contemporaries a century 
ago was no optical illusion. Even when – using information that was available to 
contemporaries – we allow for differences of monetary and fiscal policy, openness to trade, 
political stability, geographical location and level of economic development, we find that a 
                                                 
83 Clemens and Williamson,”Wealth Bias”, p. 16. See also Kelly, “Ability and Willingness”, and Fishlow, 
“Lessons From the Past”. 
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country that was a part of the British Empire was still able to borrow at significantly lower 
interest rates than one which was not.  
 
As it turned out, the inter-war period confirmed what pre-1914 investors had rightly 
suspected: it was indeed riskier to invest in sovereign foreign states than to lend to 
comparable colonial economies. There were defaults by numerous independent debtor 
countries including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Japan, Russia and Turkey.84 By contrast, 
all British colonial governments weathered the storms and stresses of the inter-war period 
without resorting to default. The imperial relationship was thus based on a virtuous circle. 
Colonial administrators tended to favor sound money, balanced budgets and openness to trade 
– precisely the things that reassured investors. In turn, the low risk premium paid by British 
colonies when they raised capital in London made it less likely that they would fall into the 
kind of debt traps that claimed other emerging markets, whose interest payments out to 
foreign creditors exceeded the amounts of money flowing in from new loans and being 
generated by the foreign-financed investments. Small wonder, then, that an increasing share of 
British overseas investment ended up going to the empire after the First World War. In the 
period before 1914, as we have seen, slightly less than half of British overseas investment 
went to the Empire. But after the First World War, the balance shifted. In the 1920s the 
Empire accounted for around two-thirds of all new issues on the London market.85  
 
Was this a good or a bad thing? When Keynes criticized the low yields on colonial loans in 
the 1920s, his point was that this state of affairs was not in the economic interests of Britain 
herself. With unemployment stubbornly stuck above pre-war levels and mounting evidence of 
industrial stagnation, capital export seemed like a misallocation of resources. But Keynes did 
                                                 
84 Lindert and Morton, “Sovereign Debt”. 
85 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 439. 
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not consider the benefits reaped by colonial economies from cheap access to British savings. 
From an imperial rather than a narrowly national point of view, it was highly desirable that 
savings from the wealthy metropolis be encouraged to flow to the developing periphery. 
Besides ensuring that British investors got their interest paid regularly and their principal paid 
back, the imperial system was conducive to global economic growth – more so, certainly, 
than an alternative policy of the sort Keynes had in mind, which would have prioritized the 
industrial production and employment of the United Kingdom. 
 
This conclusion has wider implications for modern debates about imperialism and economic 
development. Whatever the impact on Britain of large-scale overseas investment, it can hardly 
have been disadvantageous to British colonies that they could raise capital in London at rates 
around 100 basis points less than comparably endowed sovereign states. The “Empire effect” 
may well have meant more capital as well as cheaper capital. To be sure, indigenous peoples 
had little say over the ways in which the capital so raised was invested. Conceivably, 
independent governments might have invested it in ways better calculated to foster economic 
growth. Yet the record of most post-colonial governments, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, 
strongly suggests otherwise. The inability of so many former colonies today to attract foreign 
investment – other than in the form of credits or aid from non-commercial lenders and donors 
– suggests the existence of a trade-off for poor countries between political sovereignty and 
creditworthiness. The “Empire effect” encapsulated that trade-off in ways we should not 
overlook. For many poor countries struggling today to attract foreign investment, the answer 




                                                 
86 See Krasner, Organized Hypocrisy. 
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The database constructed for the this study comprises the years 1880 to 1913 at annual 
frequency. The data were collected from primary and secondary sources in Berlin 
(Staatsbibliothek), London (British Library, London School of Economics), and New York 
City (New York University). Special gratitude is due to Nitin Malla for research assistance 
and Wolfgang Hielscher (Staatsbibliothek Berlin) for greatly facilitating the work with 
numerous statistical volumes. The following financial and statistical publications were 
systematically exploited (abbreviations appear in brackets): Investor’s Monthly Manual 
(IMM); London Stock Exchange Weekly Intelligence (LSE); The Statesmen’s Yearbook 
(Yearbook); The Annual General Reports of the Council of the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders (Annual Reports); Fenn’s Compendium and Fenn on the Funds (Fenn); 
Statistical Abstracts for the Several Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom 
(Abstracts).  
 
Special gratitude is due to Trish Kelly, Peabody College, Vanderbilt University in Nashville, 
Tennessee, for sharing unpublished data collected from the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders’ Annual Reports. Additional data were gathered from historical collections, 
mainly from the three volumes by Mitchell, Historical Statistics, if the figures were also 
available to historical investors. For some indicators, we made use of Arthur Banks’ Cross-
National Time Series Database, which is a rich source, but unfortunately not very well 
documented. Prof. Banks confirmed to us in mail correspondence that all pre-1913 indicators 
we used for our study were originally collected from The Statesmen’s Yearbook. Prof. Banks 
and his collaborators converted the original series in British pounds to US dollars at an 
exchange rate of $5 per pound. We brought the series back to British pounds at the same 
conversion rate. For some countries, we were happy to rely on material collected by Michael 
Bordo, Marc Flandreau, Chris Meissner, Maurice Obstfeld, Hugh Rockoff, and Alan Taylor. 
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We are glad to acknowledge their support. Despite this collective effort, some gaps in the 
dataset nevertheless remained. 
 
The appendix is divided in two parts. The first part contains in tabular form the complete 
country sample, the short description of bonds and the sources of the annual yield data. In the 
second part, the data sources are arranged by variable.  
 
Appendix 1: country sample and sources of yield data 
British Empire   
 Source Bond 
Ceylon IMM 4%s of 1880 
Hong Kong IMM 4% debentures (1890-93), 3.5%s (1894-1913) 
India IMM 4%s (1880-84), 3.5% (1885-1913) 
Straits Settlements IMM 4.5% of 1877 (1880-90), 3.5% (1907-13) 
Canada IMM 
5%s (1880-84), 3.5% (1884-89), 3% loan 1938 (1890-
1913) 
British Guyana IMM 4% (1889-1913) 
Jamaica IMM 4.5% of 1879 (1880-89), 4% (1890-1913) 
New South Wales IMM 4% bonds  
New Zealand IMM 5%s (1880-85), 4% (1886-94), 3%s (1895-1913) 
Queensland IMM 4%s  
South Australia IMM 4% '74 
Tasmania IMM 4% of 1878-83 
Victoria IMM 4.5% of 1879 (1880-95), 4%s (1896-1913) 
Western Australia IMM 4.5% of 1879 (1880-90), W. Austr. 4% 1881 (1891-1913) 
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Gold Coast/Ghana IMM  3% (1902-13) 
Mauritius IMM  4.5% of 1876 (1880-89), 4%s (1890-13) 
Nigeria (Lagos) IMM  3.5% (1904-13) 
Sierra Leone IMM  4% conv. bonds (1904-13) 
Cape IMM  4.5% of 1873 (1880-89), 4% Cons. (1890-1913) 
Natal IMM  4.5% of 1876 (1880-89), 4%s (1890-1913) 
Orange (from 1900) IMM  6% bonds of 1884 (1885-94) 
Transvaal (from 1900) IMM  5% scrip. (1892-99), 3% loan (1903-13) 
Egypt (from 1882) IMM  4% unified debt 
 
Independent 
countries   
 source Bond 
Austria IMM  4% gold rentes 
Belgium IMM  3% of 1874 (1880-97) 
Denmark IMM  4% of 1861 (1880-84), 3% gold loan of 1894 (1895-1913) 
Hungary IMM  4% gold rentes 
Italy IMM  5% Marem. railw. 1862  
Norway IMM  4% of 1880 (1880-89), 3%s of 1888 (1890-1913) 
Sweden IMM  4% (1880-89), 3%s (1891-99), 3.5% of 1879 (1900-13) 
Bulgaria IMM  6% of 1880 (1890-1902), 6% gold loan (1902-13) 
Greece IMM 
5% independence (1880-84), 5% of 1884 (1885-99), 5% of 1881 
(1900-13) 
Montenegro LSE  5% loan (1910-13) 
Portugal IMM  3% of 1853 (1880-99), 3% ser. (1900-13) 
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Rumania IMM  8% loan (1880-89) 
Russia IMM  4% Nicolas Railway 1867 
Serbia IMM  4% unified (1898-1913) 
Spain IMM  3% ext. (1880-82), 4% ext. (1883-1913) 
Turkey IMM 
 4.25% of 1871 (1880-84), 5% priority (1885-89), 5% customs (1889-
99), 4% of 1891 (1900-13) 
Liberia IMM  5% ext. (1902-13) 
China IMM 
 8% of 1874 (1880-84), 6% (1885-94), 6% gold loan (1895-99), 4.5% 
gold bonds (1900-13) 
Japan IMM  7% of 1873 (1880-96), 4% Sterling loan (1899-1913) 
Persia IMM  5% loan (1911-13) 
Siam LSE  4.5% Sterling loan (1905-13) 
United States  
Source: Calomiris’ gold equivalent yields from Obstfeld and Taylor, 
”Sovereign Risk”. 
Argentina IMM  6% of 1867 (1880-88), 5% of 1886 (1889-1913) 
Brazil IMM  4.5% gold loan (1880-1909), 5%s (1910-13) 
Chile IMM  5% of 1873 (1880-86), 4.5% of 1886 (1887-1913) 
Colombia IMM  4.75% of 1873 (1880-96), 3% ext. (1897-99), 3%s ext. (1900-13) 
Ecuador LSE 
1% new cons. (1880-90), 1% new ext. (1891-93), 4.5% new ext. 
(1894-96), 1% ext. (1897-99), 4% salt bonds (1911-13) 
Guatemala IMM  6% Sterling (1880-88), 4%s (1889-1913) 
Mexico IMM  3% of 1851 (1880-87), 6% (1888-99), 5% cons. Ext. (1900-1913) 
Nicaragua IMM  6% bonds (1887-99), 4% (1900-10), 6% Sterling loan (1911-13) 
Peru IMM  5% cons. (1880-89), 5.5% loan (1911-13) 
Salvador LSE  6% bonds (1891-99), 6% Sterling (1908-1913) 
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Uruguay IMM  6% 1871 (1880-83), 5% unified 1883 (1884-92), 3.5% (1893-1913) 
Venezuela IMM  3% new cons. (1882-1905), 3% diplomatic debt (1906-13) 
 
 
Appendix 2: control variables 
A discussion of the choice and calculation of the economic control variables used in the 
regressions can be found in the main text. The “raw” data behind these variables were 
collected from the sources listed below. More than one source is listed if several were needed 
to get continuous time-series. This presentational choice is dictated by the size of the dataset – 
we count about 25,000 data points for the “raw” series alone. Additional information is 
available from the authors on request.  
 
Public debt 
For all countries data on total government debt come from the Yearbook, except as follows:  
New Zealand, Uruguay: sources are Fenn and the Annual Reports; 
Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, USA: from Obstfeld and Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”; 
Argentina and Chile: Yearbook, Annual Reports, and Obstfeld and Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”; 
Brazil: Yearbook, Annual Reports and Levy, “Brazilian Public Debt”; 
Egypt, Portugal, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, Venezuela: Yearbook and Annual Reports; 
Mexico: Yearbook, Annual Reports, and Siller, “Deuda y consolidacion”; 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Salvador: from Annual Reports; 
Japan: Yearbook and Juraschek, Geographisch-Statistische Tabellen; 
Liberia: Corporation of Foreign Bondholders Annual Reports; 
Greece, Turkey: Yearbook and Annual Reports; 
China: Yearbook and IMM. 
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Public revenues and expenditures 
Budget figures were taken from all three volumes of Mitchell, Historical Statistics, except as 
follows: 
Orange, Transvaal, China, Siam: Yearbook; 
Portugal, Rumania, Serbia, Colombia, Uruguay: Mitchell, Historical Statistics, and Banks, 
Cross-National Time Series; 
Montenegro, Liberia, Turkey, Persia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, Salvador from Banks, Cross-
National Time Series. 
 
Exports and imports 
Trade data were copied from Mitchell, Historical Statistics, except for: 
Transvaal, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, Western 
Australia: Yearbook; 
Turkey: Mitchell, Historical Statistics, and Yearbook; 
China, Siam: Yearbook and Banks, Cross-National Time Series; 
Liberia: Annual Reports; 
Guatemala, Peru: from Annual Reports; 
Persia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Salvador: from Banks, Cross-National Time Series. 
 
Default and previous default 
All information on default come from Kelly, “Ability and Willingness”, and the summary 
tables in the Annual Reports of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. After a debt 
rearrangement countries were coded as previous defaulters for the next ten years. 
   




The main difficulties with respect to gold coding are treated in the text. Whenever possible we 
followed the coding used by Meissner, “New World Order” (information on additional 
countries was kindly shared by Christopher Meissner) by looking both at formal gold clauses 
and subsequent exchange rate stability. For Serbia, Salvador, and Venezuela we found 
contradictory information and opted for the more reliable sources given below. However, we 
tested the sensitivity of our regressions to a change in the gold coding for these countries and 
found the effect minimal. British colonies without own currencies and thus effectively in a 
currency union with the UK were coded on gold. The West African colonies with a different 
legal tender besides Sterling (Nigeria and the Gold Coast) were coded on gold after the 
introduction of the Colonial Sterling Exchange Standard and the establishment of the West 
African Currency Board in 1912, an account of which can be found in Fieldhouse, West and 
Third World, p. 111. Coding both countries on gold throughout which could be justified in 
view of the dominant role of Sterling in international transactions did not change our results. 
As stated above, for the majority of economies Christopher Meissner kindly provided 
exchange rate regimes for 1880-1913. His data were supplemented as follows: 
India, Ceylon, Mauritius: on gold 1897-1913 from Schneider and Denzel, eds, Währungen der 
Welt; 
Straits Settlements: on gold after 1906 from Schneider and Denzel, eds, Währungen der Welt; 
British Guyana: colonial gold dollar pegged to Sterling according to Yearbook; 
Bulgaria: on gold 1909-1911 from Avramov, Bulgarian National Bank; 
Serbia: on gold throughout inferred from Juraschek, Geographisch-Statistische Tabellen, and 
Sédillot, Toutes les monnaies;  
Montenegro: off gold throughout from Sédillot, Toutes les monnaies; 
Liberia: off gold throughout inferred from information in various issues of the Yearbook; 
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Siam: on gold 1908-1913 from Schneider and Denzel, eds, Währungen der Welt, also in 
Sédillot, Toutes les monnaies; 
Colombia: on gold 1880-1885 found in Denzel, “Finanzplätze“;  
Peru: on gold 1902-1913 from Denzel, “Finanzplätze“; 
Salvador: on gold 1897-1912 according to Sédillot, Toutes les monnaies; 




If necessary, annual average exchange rates were used to convert data in local currency to 
British pounds. Due attention was paid to differences between paper currency and gold rates. 
All series come from the various tomes of Schneider and Denzel, eds, Währungen der Welt, 
supplemented as follows: 
Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Japan, 
United States: from Obstfeld and Taylor, “Sovereign Risk”; 
Colombia, Peru, Guatemala: from Denzel, “Finanzplätze”; 
Venezuela: from Kelly, “Ability and Willingness”; 
Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia: from Juraschek, Geographisch-Statistische Tabellen, and gold 
parities from Sédillot, Toutes les monnaies.   
 
Rail track 
The length of the rail track in operation was taken from Banks, Cross-National Time Series, 
and from Mitchell, Historical Statistics. Data for New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, 
South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, Straits Settlements, and for the Hungarian part 
of Austria-Hungary come from the Yearbook. 
 




Population data for independent countries are from Mitchell, Historical Statistics, and Arthur 
Banks, Cross-National Time Series. Census data for the individual Australian territories, the 
Cape Colony, Ceylon, Egypt, the Gold Coast, Mauritius, Natal, the Orange Free State/Orange 
River Colony, the Straits Settlements, British Guyana, Jamaica, New Zealand, Transvaal and 
Hungary were found in the Yearbook and the Abstracts. Gaps between census dates were 
closed by linear interpolation. 
 
Regional dummies and developing countries 
The coding of regional dummies for the European periphery, Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
followed the usual geographic classification. Central America and the Caribbean were 
included in “Latin America”. Greece, Spain, Portugal, Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, 
Montenegro, and Turkey in “European periphery”. All countries included in one of these 
regional groups were coded as “developing” countries in regression (8).  
 
Shipping distance 
Pre-Panama Canal shipping distance from London to the principal harbour of a country (in 
nautical miles) was found in Couper, ed., Atlas of the Oceans, and Philip, ed., Philip’s 
Mercantile Marine Atlas.  
 
Political conflict 
Data for involvement in international and civil war were taken from Sarkees, “Correlates of 
War”. The latest version of the correlates of war database can be found online at: 
http://cow2.la.psu.edu.  
 




Data on issues of securities at the London Stock Exchange between 1880 and 1913 all come 
from Stone, Global Export of Capital. Additional data from Irving Stone’s database were 
kindly shared by Michael Clemens and Jeffrey Williamson. The regressions use capital flow 
data for 31 economies: Argentina, Australia (total), Austria-Hungary, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Germany, Denmark, Egypt, Spain, France, Greece, India, Italy, 
Japan, Mexico, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Peru, South Africa (total), Russia, Serbia, 
Siam, Sweden, Uruguay, Turkey, United States.   
 
Determinants of capital flows 
Population and rail miles come from the sources given above. The British real interest rate 
was obtained by subtracting consumer price inflation, found in Obstfeld and Taylor, 
“Sovereign Risk”, from the consol yield. Population and export growth refer to the average 
yearly growth rate over the period. The land area (in square miles) at historical boundaries can 
be found in the Yearbook. The United States and all Western European economies (excluding 
the European periphery as described above) were coded as advanced economies.. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of yield data         
    Observations Mean StDev Min Max 
All borrowers           
  yield % p.a. 1461 5.39 2.86 2.86 22.33 
              
Independent countries           
  yield % p.a. 909 6.30 3.30 2.97 22.33 
              
Empire borrowers           
  yield % p.a. 552 3.89 0.43 2.86 6.35 
Sources: See data appendix.         
 




Table 2: Summary statistics of economic 
controls     
    Mean StDev Min Max 
            
All borrowers         
  Debt/Revenue 4.95 3.45 0.05 23.70
  Budget deficit 0.12 0.36 -0.59 9.60
  Trade balance -0.14 0.81 -14.12 0.79
  Exports/Population 4.72 7.34 0.05 66.64
            
Independent countries         
  Debt/Revenue 4.98 3.62 0.16 23.70
  Budget deficit 0.10 0.40 -0.49 9.60
  Trade balance -0.05 0.39 -2.51 0.79
  Exports/Population 2.38 2.27 0.05 12.43
            
Empire borrowers         
  Debt/Revenue 4.92 3.16 0.05 20.48
  Budget deficit 0.14 0.26 -0.59 2.00
  Trade balance -0.26 1.15 -14.12 0.69
  Exports/Population 8.63 10.56 0.16 66.64
Sources: See data appendix.       
 




Table 3: Determinants of sovereign bond spreads       
Regression 1 2 3 4 
Dependent variable:     (<1000) (<500) 
spread over UK consols current yields IMM yields current yields current yields 
          
Observations 1282 1171 1246 1171 
Groups 57 54 57 56 
R-squared 0.645 0.693 0.751 0.775 
Estimator: pooled OLS (PCSE)       
        
Empire -108.10 -97.19 -106.40 -98.13 
  (-6.23)*** (-7.33)*** (-9.61)*** (-12.32)*** 
Debt/Revenue 15.71 7.36 9.53 10.05 
  (5.45)*** (5.77)*** (5.88)*** (10.84)*** 
Budget balance -11.03 -4.79 -4.88 -0.45 
  (-0.67) (-1.4) (-1.03) (-0.13) 
Trade balance -2.99 -2.58 -2.00 -2.24 
  (-3.59)*** (-3.64)*** (-2.5)** (-2.5)** 
Exports/Population 5.47 3.79 3.86 2.48 
  (5.68)*** (5.62)*** (6.37)*** (5.49)*** 
Default 352.55 79.88 204.27 17.53 
  (6.88)*** (3.53)*** (7.77)*** (0.86) 
Previous default 172.51 42.50 84.66 37.64 
  (4.31)*** (2.22)** (4.04)*** (2.76)*** 
GS x no default -21.57 1.99 -23.27 -9.73 
  (-1.15) (0.25) (-2.37)** (-1.49) 
GS x default -13.82 163.66 0.41 42.63 
  (-0.17) (1.93)* (0.01) (0.89) 
International conflict -5.04 16.31 2.01 11.58 
  (-0.21) (1.56) (0.16) (1.75)* 
Civil conflict 77.15 11.42 31.42 8.82 
  (2.25)** (0.79) (2.13)** (0.97) 
European periphery dummy 157.58 130.50 146.17 146.09 
  (5.72)*** (5.98)*** (6.71)*** (7.89)*** 
Latin America periphery dummy 319.64 253.79 300.83 190.80 
  (8.69)*** (10.41)*** (11.61)*** (13.97)*** 
Africa periphery dummy 166.08 101.32 118.61 102.21 
  (9.84)*** (7.54)*** (12.13)*** (13.28)*** 
Asia periphery dummy 174.45 126.87 114.35 98.06 
  (7.48)*** (9.65)*** (8.12)*** (7.81)*** 
          
* = Significant at the 10 percent level       
** = Significant at the 5 percent level       
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level       
Notes: Linear regression, correlated panels and corrected standard errors (PCSE). Coefficients on time-dummies 
and country-specific rhos not reported. Figures in parentheses are z-statistics. 
Sources: See data appendix.         
 
 





Table 4: Determinants of sovereign bond spreads - sensitivity checks     
Regression 5 6 7 8 
Dependent variable:       developing countries
spread over UK consols (current yields)       
          
Observations 1282 1282 1282 831 
Groups 57 57 57 40 
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.72 
Estimator: pooled OLS (PCSE)        
        
Empire -171.73 -171.34 -86.85 -138.22 
  (-6.89)*** (-6.86)*** (-4.76)*** (-8.85)*** 
Debt/Revenue 16.59 17.40 14.21 7.14 
  (6.11)*** (6.56)*** (5.03)*** (3.29)*** 
Budget balance -8.69 -8.72 -5.02 -5.51 
  (-0.49) (-0.50) (-0.27) (-1.00) 
Trade balance -2.09 -2.05 -1.83 -0.99 
  (-2.05)** (-2.05)** (-1.79)* (-1.09) 
Exports/Population -0.31 0.04 0.71 1.19 
  (-0.68) (0.01) (3.96)*** (3.97)*** 
Default 412.34 408.66 444.51 280.25 
  (8.77)*** (8.80)*** (9.35)*** (10.52)*** 
Previous default 226.09 224.14 252.21 146.15 
  (5.98)*** (5.96)*** (6.75)*** (6.57)*** 
Gold standard -41.10 -33.94 -37.96 -16.90 
  (-2.46)** (-1.96)** (-2.27)** (-1.55) 
International conflict -11.85 -13.56 -9.73 0.92 
  (-0.45) (-0.52) (-0.38) (0.04) 
Civil conflict 107.29 107.78 116.59 54.78 
  (2.85)*** (2.86)*** (3.08)*** (2.97)*** 
Shipping distance 0.03 0.03     
  (4.99)*** (4.98)***     
Railmiles/capita   -17931.02     
    (-2.85)***     
* = Significant at the 10 percent level       
** = Significant at the 5 percent level       
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level       
Notes: Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSE). Coefficients on time-dummies and country-
specific rhos not reported. Figures in parentheses are z-statistics. 
Sources: See data appendix.         




Table 5: Bond spreads within the British Empire     
Regression   9 10 11 
Dependent variable:       
spread over UK consols (current yields)     
          
Observations   517 517 517 
Groups   22 22 22 
R-squared   0.769 0.788 0.784 
Estimator: pooled OLS (PCSE)    
       
India   -20.37 -29.48 -29.56 
    (-1.89)* (-2.88)*** (-2.90)*** 
Self governing parts 4.95 -4.01 -7.08 
    (1.08) (-0.92) -(1.28) 
Debt/Revenue   3.57 1.84 1.59 
    (3.49)*** (1.82)* (1.58) 
Budget balance   4.72 4.55 3.97 
    (1.18) (1.22) (1.01) 
Trade balance   -1.40 -1.16 -1.15 
    (-1.38) (-1.13) (-1.13) 
Exports/Population   0.78 -0.28 -0.33 
    (2.91)*** (-1.78)* (-2.16)** 
Shipping distance     0.01 0.01 
      (8.19)*** (7.97)*** 
Railmiles/capita       617.23 
        (0.4) 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level     
** = Significant at the 5 percent level     
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level     
Notes: Linear regression, correlated panels and corrected standard errors (PCSE). 
Coefficients on time-dummies and country-specific rhos not reported. Figures in 
parentheses are z-statistics. 
Sources: See data appendix.       
 
 




Table 6: Determinants of capital flows       
Regression     12 13 14 
Dependent variable:           
annual average capital inflow per head, 1880-1913 all developed less-developed 
              
Observations     152 52 100 
R-square       0.12 0.43 0.12 
Estimator: Least Squares       
         
Spread       -0.000107 -0.000220 -0.000171 
        (-1.97)** (-1.54) (-2.14)** 
Population       -1.01 -4.69 -1.35 
        (-4.01)*** (-0.05) (-3.73)*** 
Population growth     0.06 0.09 0.05 
        (1.41) (4.01)*** (1.40) 
Export growth     0.000004 0.007701 -0.001387 
        (0.00) (1.19) (-0.33) 
Rail miles / land area     -2.38 -1.20 -6.90 
        (-3.63)*** (-2.37)*** (-2.87)*** 
UK real interest rate     0.02 -0.01 0.05 
        (0.56) (-0.68) (0.80) 
Constant       0.25 0.12 0.33 
        (2.34)** (1.86)* (2.24)** 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level       
** = Significant at the 5 percent level       
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level       
Notes: Observations were averaged over five year periods (1880-84, 1885-89...) and one four year period 
(1910-13). Estimation via least squares with White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The 
figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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Sources: See data appendix.
 
 
